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abstract
in august 1914, france had already defined a pattern of war aims which would be shaped and 
amended during the next four years. regarding east-central europe, two approaches present 
themselves to the french policy-makers: the classic system of alliances to maintain the balan-
ce of power, and the new internationalist doctrine implying the priority application of the prin-
ciple of nationality. Both these concepts reacted to the geopolitical evolutions which occurred 
during the great war. the article analyses these evolutions of the french concept of a ‘world 
order’ in east-central europe between 1914 and 1918 primarily through an examination of the 
case of Poland.
Key words: first world war, security policy, alliances, self-determination, war aims, successor 
states.
anotacija
1914 m. rugpjūčio mėn. Prancūzija buvo sumodeliavusi karo tikslus, kurie toliau formuosis ir 
bus taisomi per vėlesnius ketverius metus. Prancūzijos politikai turėjo dvi pagrindines prieigas 
dėl Vidurio Rytų Europos, kurių viena buvo klasikinė sąjungų sistema, siekiant palaikyti galių 
balansą, kita – nauja internacionalinė doktrina, implikavusi nacionalinio principo pirmenybinį 
taikymą. Abi šios koncepcijos plėtojosi reaguodamos į geopolitinius pokyčius, vykusius Didžio-
jo karo metais. Straipsnyje analizuojami šie Prancūzijos „pasaulio tvarkos“ sampratos pokyčiai 
Vidurio Rytų Europoje 1914–1918 m., daugiausia aptariant lenkiškąją bylą.
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the balance of power relates to traditional european practices of diplomacy and 
security, in order to assure stability, that is to say, a state of no-war. But emerging all 
through the 19th century as what Pierre renouvin called a force profonde (the ‘pro-
found forces’ of history), the principle of nationality, which had been neglected by the 
negotiators at the congress of vienna, had become the great european liberal cau-
se. at the outbreak of war, the internationalist doctrines implying ‘peaceful coopera-
tion between states under a regime of international law [enforced] by international 
institutions’,1 had spread. in his inspiring recent book, Peter Jackson demonstrates 
that internationalist doctrines had more influence on france than is usually thought: 
during war, considering the huge sacrifice that is being made, a purpose has to be 
provided, which can be no less than a brand-new start, a promise to ‘end all wars’: 
this offers room for the ‘internationalist doctrines of peace and security’. for Paris, 
the principle of nationality, reinforced by the discourse of self-determination, ap-
pears as an extension of the french revolution’s legacy and its proclamation of the 
people’s right to govern themselves. thus, the syncretism of both these approaches, 
a balance of power and a transformed international order, constitutes the cultural 
context of the french policy-making process. during war, its conceptions of security 
are developed in external interaction provided by the allies and their own strategies, 
as well as by the surfacing of new international norms. regarding france’s security, 
east-central europe constitutes the ‘near abroad’, implying commitment but also 
responsibilities: its reshaping has to be supervised, and therefore prepared before 
any victory, with political leaders who have emerged from national forces appearing 
propitious from the french perspective. all these stakes shape the french concep-
tion of a ‘world order’ in east-central europe, whose evolutions between 1914 and 
1918 can be assessed through an examination of the case of Poland. 
i
among the french war aims, we have to distinguish between those which were set 
as early as august 1914 and would not change, and those which would emerge or 
progress during the war. the first may be described as ‘structural aims’:2 these pur-
poses were pre-established before the war, as a legacy of the 19th century; the war 
episodes therefore had little impact on them. the obvious example is the return of 
the alsace-moselle region. But this is also the case for the left bank of the rhine, 
which france had possessed at the times of the revolution and the empire: secu-
1 JacKson, P. Beyond the Balance of Power. France and the Politics of National Security in the Era of the First 
World War. Cambridge, New York, 2013, p. XI.
2 soutou, g.-h. La Grande illusion. La France et la Paix, 1914-1920. Paris, 2015, p. 133.
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ring the western german frontier was always an absolute priority, only deepened 
by the french feeling to bear most of the consequences of war. the reflections on 
germany had begun in 1871, a period when, for instance, the question of its unity 
was first asked. Again at the end of 1916, the French senior administration started 
to look for legal breaches which would allow a challenge of the existence of 1870 
germany,3 with the idea that the decentralisation of germany would go together 
with its democratisation. how solid is german unity? the controversy about this qu-
estion was initiated at the end of the 19th century in the press – the division of the 
German Empire was not a rare theme in nationalist or even rightist columns – and 
in well-informed circles, and two schools of thought emerged from the reports re-
gularly received by the Quai d’orsay.4 to some observers, the persistence of dissol-
ving idiosyncrasies was obvious, especially within the ‘catholic belt’;5 to others, the 
majority, the Prussians had to successfully unify and acculturate the different parts 
of the reich.6 in 1918, however, the dismemberment of germany was not seriously 
considered any more: only partial or provisional solutions were proposed, such as 
the occupation of the saar basin or the whole left bank of the rhineland. this status 
would allow for the demilitarisation and the ‘deprussification’ of the territory, and 
match the french hidden agenda in the economic field, for the lack of coal was an 
important stake in the ‘structural aims’: it was clear that the military victory had to 
lead to a german economic defeat.7
this ambition complied with the russian plans. on 13 september 1914, sergei sa-
zonov had expressed his views to the French ambassador Maurice Paléologue and 
his British counterpart george Buchanan: the allies’ mutual goal had to be the des-
truction of the political and military power of Germany. In Sazonov’s plan for territo-
rial settlement, which strongly challenged the unity of the reich, france would keep 
a part of the rhineland and the Palatinate. the tsar himself supported this during 
an audience granted to Paléologue on 21 november, a discourse to which the fren-
ch government reacted with ‘interest as much as sympathy’, as théophile delcassé, 
the minister for foreign affairs, said.8 But the Russian wish to seize a part of Eastern 
galicia, and also to widen the Kingdom of Poland, worried french circles, as we will 
see later.
3 Ibid, p. 137.
4 Archives du Ministères français des Affaires étrangères (AMAE, archives of the french minister of foreign 
Affairs), Série : NS 5, Sous-série : Allemagne, Politique extérieure, Fédération germanique I, 1897-1901.
5 rapport de la légation de munich, 1er juillet 1897. ibid.
6 Rapport du consulat de Stuttgart, 6 novembre 1901. Ibid.
7 BariÉty, J. le rôle de la minette dans la sidérurgie allemande et la restructuration de la sidérurgie 
allemande après le traité de versailles. in Centre de recherche Relations internationales de l’université de 
Metz. Travaux et Recherches, 1972, nº III. Metz, 1973, p. 233-277.
8 President Poincaré was more cautious: soutou, g.-h. La Grande illusion…, p. 96.
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another ‘structural’ war aim that the french government had long set, consisted of 
the progression of the ‘republican ideology’: the great war was seen as a struggle 
between civilisation, personified by france, the home of human rights, and the ger-
manic Kultur. this ‘republican ideology’ can have many avatars, and appeared under 
the notions of freedom, justice, and the rule of law: it therefore matched people’s 
right to practise self-determination. from this point of view, france’s concern with 
the Polish cause, for example, corresponded with both the defence of a french poli-
tical vision on democratic legitimacy and the purpose of an alliance.
following on from the balance of power as it was practised in the 19th century, the 
alliances were seen as mechanisms which would assure the security of the europe-
an continent. the project was then during the war to promote east european states 
which would cooperate with france when faced with an external, and mutual, threat. 
meanwhile, there was a growing consensus that the international system had to be 
reformed to prevent another such conflict, that there had to be a new system which 
would emphasise the commitment to democracy and self-determination. among 
france’s war aims was its design to entrench a more favourable strategic balance in a 
new body of international treaties.9 in order to do so, the primacy of a traditional ba-
lance of power gestated between 1914 and 1916, and the principle according to which 
the postwar order should not only be safe but also ‘fair’, would develop in the second 
half of the war: the rule of law was then to combine a transformed international order 
and an environment of security which would make cooperation possible. But before 
that, at the outbreak of the war, there was no room to promote the principle of natio-
nalities, nor any precise plan about eastern europe for that matter; only strictly patrio-
tic purposes were audible, as france was attacked by its ‘traditional’ enemy. 
ii
the second category of war aims could be named ‘evolving aims’, for they were sha-
ped by the war experience, and reacted to the different changes in the international 
system. within this category, the principle of nationality takes first place: it was de-
fined long before the war as the radical contestation of plurinational empires, but a 
contestation which would rest on a historical and dynastic legitimacy. the emancipa-
tion of nationalities was thus to occur strictly within the framework and the values of 
the balance of power,10 a position that was kept during the first phase of the war:11 
9 JACKSON, P. Op. cit., p. 81.
10 AMAE, Série : Papiers d’Agents, Sous-série : Aristide Briand, vol. 17 : « conférence de la Paix », f. 103 : 
article du 24 octobre 1918.
11 soutou, g.-h. les grandes puissances et la question des nationalités en europe centrale et orientale pendant et 
après la Première Guerre mondiale : actualité du passé ? Politique étrangère, 1993, 58 anné ,ᵉ nº 3, p. 697-711.
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the practical application of self-determination remained dependent on the interests 
of the great Powers, as it used to be within the concert of europe, and on their vi-
sion of the postwar balance of power: ‘[their] conceptions in terms of nationalities 
and their geopolitical goals played a decisive part: they used national claims at least 
as much as they helped them.’12 
as we saw, among the entente states in 1914, the russian empire was the most pro-
active regarding the definition of war aims. as early as 14 august 1914, the Procla-
mation of Petrograd, announced by grand duke nicholas, the commander-in-chief 
of the russian armies, called for the Polish people to be organised as a ‘self-govern-
ment’ who would be ‘united under the sceptre of the russian emperor’.13 and it is 
well known that it was the tsarist government that took the initiative in discussions 
on postwar planning.14 as a result, the 5 september ‘Pact of london’ established 
that no separate peace and agreement on peace conditions could occur before any 
negotiations. Sazonov’s ‘Thirteen Points’ was the next step: the Russian foreign mi-
nister’s document suggested rolling back the frontiers of the german and habs-
burg empires, in Galicia, the province of Poznan, southern Silesia and East Prussia. 
austria-hungary would lose Polish, ukrainian and south-slav subjects, and germany 
would be kept united but reduced both in the west and the east. in this case, ger-
man power would be dismantled, providing the basis for french security, but the 
principle of nationality would be no less than totally ignored. on the other side of the 
continent, the difficulty of the french position came from the fact that the existence 
of an austro-hungarian empire in the middle of europe was very precious to the go-
vernment’s views on security: the dual monarchy was seen as the pivot on which the 
balance of europe was assured.15 this vision began to change with the ‘Peace note’ 
of the central Powers, which was greeted with hostility by the allies on 12 december 
1916. This note showed without any doubt that Austro-Hungarian ambitions were 
directed against russian power; in fact, it appeared later that their programme in-
cluded annexing at least half of serbia and the coastline of montenegro, and uniting 
the russian and austrian parts of Poland into one semi-autonomous kingdom under 
habsburg sovereignty.
12 soutou, g.-h. L’Europe de 1815 à nos jours. Paris, 2007, p. 138.
13 schramm, t. la question polonaise au cours de la première guerre mondiale. in Penser le système 
international XIXe–XXIe siècles, autour de l’œuvre de Georges-Henri Soutou. Dir. É.  BUSSIÈRE, I.  DAVION, 
O. FORCADE et al. Paris, 2013, p. 15-29.
14 In July 1914, Russian diplomacy was very present already: Sazonov supported the idea of direct talks with 
austria-hungary, a perspective which the russian ambassadors in Paris and london had to talk their 
host governments into: OTTE, Th. G. July Crisis, the World’s Descent into War, Summer 1914. cambridge, 
2014, p. 290.
15 davion, i. conceptions et visions de l’europe centrale et orientale, des empires multinationaux à l’entre-
deux-guerres. in L’Europe de Versailles à Maastricht, Visions, moments et acteurs des projets européens. dir. 
N. BEAUPRÉ, C. MOINE. Versailles, 2007, p. 51-67.
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it is generally acknowledged that the allies’ statement of 10 January 1917, in res-
ponse to the woodrow wilson note published three weeks earlier, constituted an 
unreserved acceptance of the principle of nationality: in fact, the ‘liberation of the 
Italians, Slavs, Romanians and Czechoslovakians from foreign domination’ was a 
very ambiguous slogan. from the allies’ point of view, it was nothing but a gesture 
for their partisans from Austria-Hungary, especially the Czech National Committee. 
it did not automatically imply a destruction of the dual monarchy, but was fully com-
patible with its transformation into a federal state.16 neither the french nor the Bri-
tish authorities were, at this point, in favour of suppressing the empire.17 and as for 
Prime minister aristide Briand, this was a short-term manoeuvre, aiming at worrying 
vienna and thus weakening the adversaries.18 ‘slavs’ was indeed a very vague word, 
which rather referred to the Poles anyway … the yugoslavs, for instance, were not 
concerned here, because of the italians’ opposition. therefore, all these statements 
were mostly intended to thwart german policy. But in the spring of 1917, the loss of 
its main prewar ally, russia, changed the whole environment of france’s security po-
licy. meanwhile, the involvement of the united states as a belligerent prepared the 
‘transnationalisation’ of the postwar order: the american views on the international 
system to come had to be taken into consideration, and they could be different to 
the european perspective on many points regarding east-central europe. this com-
bination of the russian revolution and american commitment reinforced the vision 
of a struggle between western democracy and eastern autocracy. as Peter Jackson 
puts it: ‘democratisation gradually became a central war aim of the allied and as-
sociated Powers over the course of 1917-18. this opened the way for discourse of 
self-determination to play an ever more influential role in shaping conceptions of 
the post-war order.’19 the ‘war for civilisation’ had now crystallised into a struggle 
between an archaic understanding of the world (the central Powers) and an open 
commitment for geopolitical reform (the allies).
thus in July 1917, the french government did not react when the ‘corfu declaration’ 
formalised the project for a Kingdom of serbs, croats and slovenes; nine months 
later, it officially acknowledged the line adopted by the ‘congress of oppressed na-
tionalities’ in Rome: the delegates Edvard Beneš, Milan Rastislav Štefánik and Ante 
Trumbić, first of all managed to convince the Allies that a democratic and enten-
tophile alternative to austria-hungary existed. nevertheless, in the eyes of western 
powers in general, and france in particular, the principle of nationality was not ab-
solute but relative, and so could not apply indiscriminately. as a consequence, the 
16 soutou, g.-h. L’Or et le Sang. Les buts de guerre économiques de la première guerre mondiale. Paris, 1989, 
p. 397.
17 ROTHWELL, V. H. British War Aims and Peace Diplomacy 1914-1918. Oxford, 1971, p. 79.
18 suareZ, g. Briand. T. IV : Le pilote dans la tourmente, 1916-1918. Paris, 1940, p. 114-115.
19 JACKSON, P. Op. cit.,p. 83.
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big issue remained to establish how to discriminate … thus to answer the question: 
what is it that makes a nationality? which human groups could be concerned with 
self-determination?20 in france, the notion appeared during the second empire in or-
der to allow a selection: the notion of ‘big nationality’, which targeted ‘wide historical 
groups […] based on a well-established “general will”’.21 this definition tended to mix 
with the notion of ‘community of civilisation’, with the idea, which was widespread at 
the end of the 19th century, that the emergence of a national consciousness implies 
a rather ‘achieved level of civilisation’ following certain criteria: the development of an 
education system, flourishing arts and culture, and the appearance of an intellectual 
class. with its multicentenarian history and its experience of statehood, Poland, for 
instance, was an ideal candidate; and because of their strategic interests, the great 
Powers could only, at the beginning of the war, delay their recognition of the legiti-
macy of the Poles’ claims. the events of 1917, and the armistices in eastern europe 
during the spring of 1918, helped to clarify the necessity to defend the principle of 
nationality, for it was clear the continent would never go back to the prewar concert 
of europe. But even so, as in 1918 the nationalities became an unavoidable fact, ge-
opolitical considerations kept their importance for the french authorities, who inclu-
ded them in their policy: self-determination was strongly adjusted to the necessity of 
a ‘Barrière de l’est’, a postwar alliance system in eastern europe against Bolshevism. 
and all hope was not yet lost of witnessing the reunion of a democratic, in its western 
meaning, russia, on which to build a stronger alliance. only in the spring of 1918 did 
the western Powers give up their dream to watch the russian revolution fail. until 
then, no precise commitment about eastern frontiers could be made.
iii
the foreign and security policy of france thus kept on following traditional practices, 
such as the balance of power, implying what Keith neilson calls ‘old-fashioned allian-
ce diplomacy’.22 this approach remained at the heart of all projects, but a growing 
number of Quai d’orsay officials, belonging to a new generation, believed in a multi-
lateral security system establishing the rule of law, and promoted greater economic 
cooperation. from this point of view, ‘the need to enforce the rule of law in interna-
tional society as one of france’s major war aims’23 entailed the building of a whole 
20 AMAE, Série : Papiers d’Agents, Sous-série : Stephen Pichon, vol. 6 : « Note sur les réglements de la paix 
du 23 décembre 1918 », f. 175.
21 SOUTOU, G.-H. L’Europe de 1815…, p. 137.
22 neilson K. Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919–1939. Cambridge, 2006, 
p. 318.
23 JACKSON, P. Op. cit., p.  9.
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new architecture in east-central europe. of course, as Peter Jackson demonstrates, 
traditional conceptions of security dominated the cultural reflexes of diplomats and 
many political leaders. But the internationalist principles which gained in popularity 
within the parliamentary and public spheres all through the war had an influence 
which can be detected in the prescriptions of the charles Benoist committee.
in order to solve the contradictions existing between the various interests which 
were raised by the french policy, a confidential committee was organised in 1917, as 
it was in england (the admiralty war aims committee) and in the united states (the 
inquiry): the charles Benoist committee (or comité d’études), named after the mP 
who was asked by aristide Briand in January 1917 to set up a group of scholars from 
the fields of history and geography, was in charge of cogitating about war aims and 
territorial settlements.24 their heavy task was to anticipate the key problems and de-
fuse them.25 From the summer of 1916, the French government was involved in the 
clarification of its war aims: the missions led by the secretary gaston doumergue in 
Petrograd, and the diplomat Paul cambon in london, illustrated this process. in rus-
sia as in england, two directions were guaranteed for french diplomacy: a free hand 
for the northeastern frontier, and an occupation of the rhineland providing ‘serious 
guarantees’ of security.26 in france, discussions took place at the highest levels of 
the executive and the general staff, and priority was predictably enough given to 
issues of strict national security. But they also led to questioning an eventual rappro-
chement with austria-hungary, even a separate peace, in order to put pressure on 
germany. therefore, the future of the dual monarchy was still open, and so was the 
place given to the principle of nationality.
among the comité d’études, where the greatest french specialists gathered to sum-
mon historical, geographical and philological knowledge, the same debates were 
discussed. to prevent any conflict between triple entente members, who promised 
in september 1914 to agree previously to any peace treaty, charles Benoist and his 
colleagues had to detect and explain the eventual sticking points. the reactions of 
the third republic’s most prominent intellectuals are eloquent: the great historian 
of the slav world ernest denis thus asserted during one session, that ‘everyone is a 
little bit of an imperialist in Poland.’27 But distinguishing between the east and the 
west of the future borders, he recognised even so, that ‘our interest is not that [Po-
land] get on with germany, but, accordingly with a long-term tradition, that it stays 
with us against the germanic danger.’ the Polish case brought out so many contra-
24 Benoist, ch. Souvenirs. T. III : 1902-1933. Vie parlementaire, vie diplomatique. Paris, 1934, p. 325.
25 all its minutes have recently been published in extenso: Les Experts français et les frontières d’Après-
guerre. Les procès-verbaux du comité d’études 1917-1919. Introduction et notes par I. DAVION. Paris. 2015.
26 soutou, g.-h. la france et les marches de l’est, 1914-1919. in Revue Historique, 1978, t. CCLX, fasc. 2 
(528), p. 341-388.
27 Comité d’études, session du 3 décembre 1918. In Les Experts français…, p. 162.
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dictions regarding postwar europe that it could not be taken as a whole, but had to 
be divided into many questions, each bringing its own framework. for example, the 
issue of free access to the sea, a war aim of the allies, carried the idea of responsibi-
lity in the face of history: as Danzig was economically underdeveloped, the historian 
Louis Eisenmann concluded that: ‘We have the right to tell the Germans: “We are ta-
king away from you a harbour that you lost interest in, of which you even prevented 
the development.”’28 
the comité d’études archives also illustrate the french vision of the Baltic states, 
which were, at this time, not considered in themselves, but analysed through the 
prism of both the german threat and the russian benefits: if the largest autonomy 
were granted to them, asked the experts, what would be the benefits to a federal, 
even confederal russia?29 in this case, as in others, the treaty of Brest-litovsk clari-
fied the situation, giving the Quai d’orsay the latitude to support directly Baltic in-
dependence. But even then, the expedition by the whites in siberia during the sum-
mer of 1918 dictated prudence,30 and Baltic issues still responded to contradictory 
aspects, such as keeping the soviets away from the area, letting the white russians 
organise themselves there, and supporting self-determination.
iv
as we know, the issue of Polish independence came up at a moment when this 
political cause seemed forgotten. this eclipse was partly due to the fact that during 
most of the 19th century, this was not a question which threatened peace, as did, 
for example, the Belgian question during the 1830s, or nationalism in the Balkans at 
the end of the 19th century. But it was also a consequence of france’s redeployment 
of its priorities: the french authorities, who used to be the most important and pro-
gressive supporters of the Polish cause until 1870, withdrew into their own national 
struggle about the alsace-moselle region.31 But as we saw, whereas the principle of 
nationality was not indiscriminately welcomed by french officials, it won unanimous 
if cautious support regarding the Polish situation. for historical as well as sentimen-
28 Session du 14 mai 1919. In Les Experts français…, p. 231.
29 Session du 22 janvier 1919. In Les Experts français…, p. 193-194.
30 gueslin, J. la france face aux indépendances baltes, de Brest-litovsk à la conférence de la Paix. 
Relations Internationales, 1998, nº°93, p. 53.
31 every link was far from being cut, though. in 1889, at the second international socialist workers 
Congress of Paris, Józef Piłsudski met Alexandre Millerand and Aristide Briand: JEDRZEJEWICZ, W. Jozef 
Pilsudski, une biographie. Lausanne, 1986, p. 29.
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tal and religious reasons, the question of the rebirth of the Polish nation arose as 
early as 1914.32
Some aspects of Sazonov’s ‘Thirteen Points’ caused tension between the tsar and 
rené viviani’s government: the demand for constantinople and the straits of cour-
se, but the Polish question especially. the suggestion of self-government under the 
russian sceptre hurt the french elite’s sympathy for the cause of Polish indepen-
dence, even if, as we saw, these opinions remained discreet. aware of this reticen-
ce, russia warned the french government against any interference: Poland was a 
matter of russian internal policy.33 there had to be, however, some adjustment in 
french circles between Polish tropism and the necessity for a military alliance with 
russia: the resurgence of an independent Poland could not be supported for as long 
as st Petersburg did not. like others, the Polish nation would have to make its way 
between the interests of the Great Powers, by seizing opportunities and adapting to 
the context. But the will to convince russia to grant the largest possible autonomy 
became more insistent in the autumn of 1916, when Germany and Austria proclai-
med their plan for the reconstitution of Poland.
the geopolitical evolutions in russia and among the central Powers rushed things: 
in order to oppose germany’s projects for Polish volunteer troops, on 4 June 1917, 
the french president, raymond Poincaré, signed a decree creating the Polish army 
in france. three months later, roman dmowski’s Polish national committee was de 
jure acknowledged as an official authority by the allies: by france in september, the 
united Kingdom and italy in october, and the united states in december. thanks to 
the Bolshevik revolution and the fall of austria-hungary, the Polish cause had even-
tually fully met what had become the key principle among the entente’s war aims: 
the principle of nationality. the unmovable basis of the western Powers’ conception 
of a future Poland was thus recapitulated through the statement pronounced at the 
versailles inter-allied conference on 3 June 1918: ‘a united and independent Polish 
state with free access to the sea constitutes one of the conditions of a strong and fair 
peace and of the rule of law in europe.’34 however, if the Poles’ right to reestablish 
their own state was settled for good, the issue of its geographical boundaries caused 
huge difficulties, above the reluctance that the composition of the Polish national 
committee had already aroused among western policy-makers.35 one of the main 
reasons why french circles were so cautious about independence was the wides-
32 laroche, J. Au Quai d’Orsay avec Briand et Poincaré, 1913–1926. Paris, 1957.
33 The socialist minister for munitions Albert  Thomas, during a mission to Petrograd in April 1916, 
commented ruefully on ‘this Polish question which has troubled franco-russian relations for so long’: 
JACKSON, P. Op. cit., p. 99.
34 filasiewicZ, s. La question polonaise pendant la guerre mondiale (recueil des actes diplomatiques, 
Traités et Documents concernant la Pologne, t. 2). Paris, 1920, note nº 212.
35 Erasm Piltz excepted. AMAE, Série : Z-Europe 1918-1940, Sous-série : Pologne, vol. 130, f. 1 : note pour le 
ministre du 26 novembre 1918.
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pread suspicion about separatists in east-central europe: would they not be, in fact, 
allies of germany? the rebirth of a nascent Polish state on enemy soil, the regency 
Kingdom of Poland in November 1916, had not helped. Otherwise, the suspicions 
turned out to be strongest about the ukrainian and Baltic leaders, even if western 
leaders found it difficult to follow the political evolutions of the whole east-central 
area: the Poles and ukrainians, especially, happened to be very divided, and dispara-
te information was provided about them by self-proclaimed experts. this complexity 
maintained Britain’s circumspection towards slav affairs in general, and Polish ones 
in particular: on 4 november 1918, as the Quai d’orsay took advantage of dmowski’s 
departure for america, to have the comité national Polonais officially recognised as 
a de facto government, the foreign office did not approve of the move.
above the complexity of the political situation, the territorial stakes were first to 
shape the position of the western Powers. this tricky issue of borders led them to 
be very cautious, even when, as in the Polish case, they had already acknowledged 
the political existence of the state: on 3 december 1917, the inter-allied conference, 
following wilson’s slogan, advocated the formation of ‘a united and independent 
Poland’: a formulation which allowed the launch of a smokescreen over the precise 
definition of its territorial sovereignty ... everything still had to be interpreted, and as 
the application of the principle of nationality implies making nation and state coinci-
de, it required rules in order to determine the frontiers, a very difficult task if ever. in 
his fourteen Points, wilson recommended drawing ‘clear demarcation lines’ betwe-
en nationalities; he also spoke of the ‘genuinely Polish’ lands, an expression he had 
taken from david lloyd george. until the spring of 1918, the allies thus produced a 
body of tactical promises about territorial questions, which did not give full approval 
and adoption of the Polish programme. the treaties of Brest-litovsk and Bucharest 
changed this order in march 1918, for the notion of self-determination now helped 
to assure the balance of power by allowing the (re-)birth of states which, like Poland 
and Czechoslovakia, were going to counterbalance postwar Germany.36 this priori-
ty given by france to the alliance de revers dictated its support for Polish territorial 
claims in the west: a support which was far from unconditional, but limited by the 
necessity to draw borders which responded to self-determination as much as eth-
nographic limits.37 But these categories did not match the Polish programme, which 
referred to the 1772 situation, whose pluriethnic, multicultural Poland alarmed the 
allies: the borders of the Polish-lithuanian commonwealth drew a line which inclu-
ded vilna and its region, and minsk. this programme was therefore far from corres-
ponding to the ‘genuinely Polish lands’ mentioned by the fourteen Points.
36 AMAE, Série : A-Paix, Sous-série : 1914-1920, vol. 61, f. 14 : 20 décembre 1918. 
37 davion, i. Mon voisin, cet ennemi. La politique de sécurité française face aux relations polono-tchécoslovaques 
entre 1919 et 1939 (Enjeux internationaux / International Issues, Vol. 4). Bruxelles et al., 2009.
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concluding remarks
the french hesitations between the balance of power and the principle of natio-
nality found their resolution during the spring of 1918, when both these strategies 
gathered in one single project of ‘ententophile’ successor-states. their insertion into 
the new normative standards of ‘wilsonian diplomacy’ would have to wait until the 
mid-1920s though. only after the ruhr failure in 1923 would france truly advocate 
collective security and its project of enmeshing the enemy, germany or russia, in a 
net of multilateral responsibilities and collective guarantees. But these plans would 
imply cooperation between the successor states themselves, as well as between 
those actors and their former, but still potential, adversary.
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GALIų BALANSAS AR NACIONALINIS PRINCIPAS? PRANCūZIJOS PLANų  
DėL VIDURIO RYTų EUROPOS EVOLIUCIJA PER PIRMąJį PASAULINį KARą
isabelle davion
santrauka
Prancūzijai nacionalinis principas, sustiprintas tautinio apsisprendimo diskurso, yra tary-
tum Prancūzijos revoliucijos ir jos šūkio dėl žmonių teisės valdyti save patiems palikimo 
tąsa. Todėl abiejų prieigų – galių balanso ir transformuotos tarptautinės tvarkos – sinkre-
tizmas formavo kultūrinį Prancūzijos politinės veiklos proceso per karą kontekstą.
Vertinant Prancūzijos tikslus kare, būtina atskirti tuos, kurie buvo nustatyti jau 1914 m. 
rugpjūčio mėn. ir vėliau nekito, nuo tų, kurie atsirado ir progresavo karo metu. Pirmieji gali 
būti apibūdinti kaip „struktūriniai tikslai“: juos suponavo ikikarinė situacija, XIX šimtmečio 
palikimas, dėl to karo epizodai turėjo jiems maža įtakos. Antrąją karo tikslų kategoriją ga-
lima pavadinti „besiplėtojančiais tikslais“, kadangi juos formavo karo patirtis ir reakcijos į 
įvairius tarptautinės sistemos pokyčius. Būtent šioje karo tikslų kategorijoje nacionalinis 
principas užėmė pagrindinę vietą – jis buvo nustatytas gerokai iki karo kaip radikalus dau-
gianacionalinių imperijų užginčijimas, bet užginčijimas, kuris rėmėsi istorine bei dinastine 
legitimacija. Tautų emancipacija tokiu būdu turėjo įvykti griežtai galių balanso rėmuose ir 
laikantis jo vertybių, ir tokios pozicijos laikytasi pirmajame karo etape.
Išplaukiant iš galios balanso, tokio, koks jis buvo praktikuojamas XIX amžiuje, sąjungos 
buvo regimos kaip mechanizmai Europos žemyno saugumui užtikrinti. Todėl karo metu 
formavosi projektas paskatinti Rytų Europos valstybes, kurios galėtų bendradarbiauti su 
Prancūzija, susidūrus su bendra išorine grėsme. Be to, į Prancūzijos karo tikslus įėjo ir jos 
projektas įtvirtinti palankesnį strateginį balansą naujų tarptautinių sutarčių bloku. Sie-
kiant tai įgyvendinti, pirmumo teikimas galių balansui nuo 1914 iki 1916 m. buvo pras-
mingas. Nei Prancūzijos, nei Britanijos valdžia šiuo periodu nesiekė susilpninti imperijų. 
Tačiau Rusijos revoliucijos ir Amerikos įsitraukimo į karą kombinacija sustiprino kovos 
tarp Vakarų demokratijos ir Rytų autokratijos viziją.
1917 m. įvykiai, paliaubos Rytų Europoje 1918 m. pavasarį nuskaidrino būtinybę ginti naci-
onalinį principą, kadangi tapo aišku, jog žemynas niekuomet nebegrįš prie ikikarinio „Euro-
pos koncerto“. Bet netgi suvokus tai, kai 1918 m. nacionaliniai savitumai tapo neišvengiamu 
faktu, geopolitiniai sumetimai Prancūzijos valdžiai toliau vaidino svarbų vaidmenį. Ji rėmėsi 
jais, nustatydama savąją politiką: apsisprendimo teisė buvo stipriai derinama su būtinybe 
suformuoti „Barrière de l’Est“ – pokarinę sąjungų prieš bolševizmą sistemą Rytų Europoje. 
Maža to, dar nebuvo prarasta viltis sulaukti demokratinės (vakarietiška prasme) Rusijos su-
sivienijimo, kad ja būtų galima remtis formuojant pajėgesnę sąjungą. Tik 1918 m. pavasarį 
didžiosios Vakarų valstybės nustojo sapnuoti, kad Rusijos revoliucija patirs nesėkmę. Todėl 
iki tol dėl Rytų Europos nebuvo žadama nieko preciziško.
Nors karui persiritus į antrąją pusę Vakarų valstybės ir Prancūzija vis labiau pripažino na-
cionalinį principą, jų akimis, tas principas buvo ne absoliutus, bet santykinis, taigi nebū-
tinai taikytinas visuotinai. Antrosios imperijos metais Prancūzijoje susiformavo pažiūra, 
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leidusi šiuo klausimu daryti tam tikrą selekciją – pažiūra apie „didžiąsias tautas“. Turė-
dama kelių šimtmečių valstybingumo patirties istoriją, Lenkija šiuo atveju atitiko tokią 
pažiūrą idealiai, ir dėl savųjų strateginių interesų didžiosios valstybės karo pradžioje ne-
galėjo sau leisti ilgai atidėlioti lenkų pretenzijų teisėtumo pripažinimą. Tačiau Prancūzijos 
sluoksniuose tuo metu dar reikėjo pasiekti tam tikrą suderinimo tarp simpatijų Lenkijai ir 
būtinybės turėti karinę sąjungą su Rusija, todėl nepriklausomos Lenkijos atgimimas ne-
galėjo būti remiamas tol, kol to nerėmė Sankt Peterburgas. Viena pagrindinių priežasčių, 
paaiškinančių, kodėl Prancūzijoje labai atsargiai žiūrėta į nepriklausomybes, buvo plačiai 
paplitę įtarimai dėl Rytų Europos separatistų, esą jie iš tiesų galėję būti Vokietijos sąjungi-
ninkai. Regentinės Lenkijos karalystės sukūrimas Vokietijos ir Austrijos sutarimu 1916 m. 
lapkričio mėn. išsklaidyti tokių įtarimų nepadėjo. Stipriausiai tokie įtarimai buvo reiškiami 
dėl ukrainiečių ir rytinės Baltijos lyderių, nors Vakarų lyderiams išties buvo sudėtinga su-
vokti visos Vidurio ir Rytų Europos politinius vingius. Iš dalies dėl to lenkų nacijai reikėjo 
atrasti sau vietą tarp didžiųjų valstybių interesų, naudojantis galimybėmis ir adaptuojan-
tis prie konteksto. Visgi pasiryžimas įtikinti Rusiją suteikti Lenkijai plačiausią, kokią įmano-
ma, autonomiją 1916 m. rudenį, Vokietijai ir Lenkijai įgyvendinus savąjį Lenkijos atkūrimo 
projektą, tapo įkyresnis. Rusijoje prasidėjus revoliucijai, geopolitinio jos vaidmens kaita 
paskubino įvykius: siekiant sudaryti atsvarą Lenkijos projektui sukurti lenkų savanorių 
dalinius, 1917 m. birželio 4 d. prezidentas Raymondas Poincaré pasirašė dekretą dėl Len-
kijos kariuomenės steigimo Prancūzijoje. Po trijų mėnesių Romano Dmowskio Lenkijos 
nacionalinis komitetas buvo de jure sąjungininkų pripažintas kaip oficialius įgaliojimus 
turintis organas. Dėl bolševikų revoliucijos ir Austrijos-Vengrijos žlugimo, Lenkijos klau-
simas galiausiai visiškai atitiko tai, kas tapo pagrindiniu Antantės karo tikslų principu, – 
nacionalinį principą. Vis dėlto nors lenkų teisė atkurti savąją valstybę buvo laiminama, 
Lenkijos geografinių sienų klausimas kėlė milžiniškų sunkumų.
Prancūzijos svyravimai tarp galių balanso ir nacionalinio principo, išsisprendę 1918 m. 
pavasarį, kai abi šios strategijos susijungė į vieną projektą – skatinti Vidurio Rytų Europoje 
Antantei palankias valstybes įpėdines. Jų įtraukimo į naujus „vilsoniškosios diplomatijos“ 
normatyvinius standartus, tiesa, reikėjo palaukti iki 3-iojo dešimtmečio vidurio.
